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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since a typical regulatory mandate can be equated in its economic effect
to a combination of an expenditure program and a taxprogram, observ-
ers have often suggested that it would serve consistent public policy to
bring regulatory decisions into the same budgetary framework.This
paper concerns an important example of a regulatory program that
would mimic deficit financing in effectinga transfer of fiscal burdens
toward younger and future generations: the mandated purchaseof (or
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provision by employers of) health care insurance under a systemof
community rating, under which the same price is charged for health
insurance for all corners, regardless of age, sex, or healthcondition. Such
a shift would result in redistributionsof burdens across birth cohorts, in
this case from existing, especially middle-aged birth cohorts, toward
young and future generations. Using data from a varietyof sources, we
conclude the effect would be substantial. For our central-case assump-
tions about discount, health care cost, and productivity growth rates,
and about the locus of responsibility for paying health care bifis, ashift
to community rating is estimated to generate gains forpeople over age
30 in 1994, $16,700 per person aged 50, for example, at the cost to
younger cohorts. Those born in 1994 wouldacquire an extra payment
obligation with a discounted value of $7,100 each. The burden passed
along to future generations can be described by a $9,300 per capita tax at
birth (growing with productivity). The analysis makes clear that the
regulatory policy shift, with no direct budgetary implications, would
have an intergenerational transfer effect comparable to what would be
considered a major change in on-budget tax or transfer programs.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely understood that government can accomplish throughregula-
tion many of the same objectives as are served by expenditure programs.
A typical regulatory mandatefor example, a requirement thatlocal
governments ensure the attainment of some specified level ofdrinking
water puritycan be equated with a combination of anexpenditure
program (compensation for the cost ofattaining the specified water qua!-
ity) and a tax program (a tax on communities whose water qualityfalls
short of the target standard). Observers have often suggested that it
would serve consistent public policy to bring such regulatorydecisions
into the same budgetary framework as applies to spendingand taxing.
Absent such an innovation, some would take comfort in the belief that,
since a regulatory program perforce carries within itself its ownfinanc-
ing, it cannot alter the budget deficit.
If, however, one regards a budget deficit as an indicator of a transfer of
fiscal burdens toward younger and future generations, the comfort would
be misplaced. This paper concerns an important example of a regulatory
program that has been seriously consideredwithout, apparently, any
recognition that its economic effect would be a very significant transfer of
fiscal burdens toward the young and inborn. The example is a mandated
purchase of (or provision by employers of) health care insurance under a
system of community rating.Community-Rated Health Insurance1311
Advocates of health care reform legislation have various goals, which
we may divide in the usual economists' way into distributional and
allocational objectives. Among the allocational objectives would be the
goal of correcting perceived or actual defects in the functioning of the
market for health care and, especially, for health insurance (morepre-
cisely, insurance against the event of having a demand for certain health
care services). Into this category would go the objective of controlling
health care costs. Here the imperfections to be correctedare often cre-
ated by existing policy interventions, especially the favorable incometax
treatment of health care expenditures covered by employers, as wellas
various regulatory constraints (such as mandates requiring that particu-
lar services be covered in allowable insurance policies). In addition,
many believe that adverse selection gives rise to excessive commitment
of resources to underwriting and presents an opportunity touse man-
dated coverage (in one version, "single payer" nationalized health care)
to improve an unregulated equilibrium.
Distributional concerns have figured strongly in the debateas well. In
addition to helping the poor, many advocate helping those witha combi-
nation of unfavorable health characteristics and pooror expensive health
care insurance (the "pre-existing condition problem"). Community rating
is intended to serve this objective. The term community rating describes the
regulatory requirement that an insurer who offers to sella specified insur-
ance contract to someone at a particular price offer the same coverage at
the same price to all comers within the "community" to which thatperson
belongs. If the community in question could be defined by the insurer, the
term would connote little more than the standard practice in the industry
of dividing the potentially covered population into classes within which
no attempt is made to distinguish people for pricing coverage. Much more
is implied when, as is intended in this context, the community is defined
by the regulator.
Putting aside the geographical aspects of the definition of communities
(which themselves pose interesting issues), community rating schemes
typically involve one of three kinds of discrimination:
No discrimination: The community is the entire population, and prices
are the same for everyone.
Discrimination by age: The community is the population born ina par-
ticular time period, and prices may vary by date of birth.
Discrimination by age and gender: The community is the maleor female
population born in a particular time period, and pricesmay vary by
date of birth and gender.132Bradford & Max
In this analysis we use the term pure communityrating to refer to the first
of these schemes and a term such as age-adjustedcommunity rating to refer
to others. When it is clear from the context,the term community rating,
with no modifier, means pure community rating.
Pure community rating has been enacted intolaw by several states
although without the crucial requirement of mandatorypurchase or pro-
vision (Hall, 1994). Evidence of its appeal morebroadly is the fact that it
was adopted in PresidentClinton's Health Security Act (HSA) as the
way to spread the risk of thedemand for health care services across the
whole society.1 Some form of community rating(in some cases, age
adjusted) was contained in almost every reformproposal introduced in
the 103d Congress, a period when health carereform was at the center of
attention in both Congress and the executivebranch. In fact, the Wall
Street Journal reported that "so attractive isthe concept of 'community
rating,' that even many Republicans andconservative Democrats say
Congress should go ahead and enact it."2Whether health reform pro-
ceeds on an incremental basis, or on a comprehensivelevel, as in the
103d Congress, community rating is likely tofigure in the debate. Yet
understanding of its implications, either for the functioningof insurance
markets or for the redistributions that it wouldimply, is scanty.
In this analysis we focus on one of thedistributional implications of a
requirement of community rating. The objectivesof redistributing wel-
fare from relatively well-off to relatively poor,and from those with good
health or good insurance to those with poor healthand no or poor
insurance, have been mentioned as possibleobjectives of advocates of
community rating. A shift to pure community ratingwould, however,
result in redistributions along other dimensions(for example, between
people with different tastes for health care) that are,arguably, not the
objectives of reformers. One such redistribution is acrossbirth cohorts,
in this case from young and future generationstoward existing, espe-
cially middle-aged, birth cohorts. Given the recent concernwith budget
deficits and their potential effect on future generations,it is particularly
important that we understand the considerableredistribution, to the
disadvantage of future birth cohorts, that would occurthrough a switch
1Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1994). TheAct contained a great
many provisions. Among them wereprovisions that mandated provision of insurance to
employees, established purchasing cooperatives to controlregional insurance regulation,
marketing and cost, required pure community ratingwithin regions, established a mini-
mum benefits package (including coverageof long term care), set global budgets, and
limited the tax deductibility of health insurance.
2"Community-rated Health Plans Prove Popular, but Success MayDepend on Universal
Coverage," Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1994.Community-Rated Health Insurance133
to a system of pure community rating. Our object here is to provide
quantitative estimates of this redistribution effect.
For purposes of our calculations, we make a critical assumptionthat
the path of actual health care expenditures is independent of the system
of financing. Some would argue that health care reform will have a large
effect on this path. Advocates of a particular proposal generally claim it
wifi produce lower outlays, while opponents may claim the reverse. We
here take no position on the matter. For purposes of this exercise, we
assume that between age-adjusted and pure community-rated plans
there is no difference in the path of expenditures, just in the path of
outlays of those who pay the bills.
2. GENERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
2.1 The Effect of a Shift to Community Rating
The potential importance of a shift to community rating may be illus-
trated by some rough calculations for the case of the HSA. A study
prepared for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) by the firm of
Hay/Huggins estimated the average health care cost of males aged 25 to
29, for example, at 55 percent of the average cost of everyone in the
population in 1988. The same study put the average cost of health care of
a male aged 60 to 64, the age of many retirees, at 200 percent of the
population average in 1988.
Under pure community rating, premiums for health coverage for
everyone below 65 would not depend on age. (Those 65 and older would
continue to be covered by Medicare.) The common premium level would
increase over time if the desired level of health care expenditures contin-
ued to rise. This complexity makes estimating the total effect difficult.
But we can put a rough lower bound on the size of the transfer of
burdens from older to younger and future generations if we assume
there is no increase in real per capita expenditures.
In round numbers, the average premium per covered adult under the
HSA was predicted to be $2,000 in 1994. (This amount would cover the
adults' children. The premium in the HSA was to depend some on
family status and geographical region but not on age.) The figures in the
CRS report indicate that if a single premium such as thisthat is inde-
pendent of agewere imposed, payments by those below their mid-
forties would increase, and there would be a decrease for older insureds.
Combining this result with the CRS data and with the male and female
ratios in the U.S. population (as of 1991), we put the average cost of
coverage in 1994 at about $1,350 for people aged 25 to 29; the average
cost for those aged 60 to 64 at about $4,000. The difference between the134Bradford & Max
community-rated premium and the estimated cost would result in an
increase in the amount paid per year by a young person of about $650
and a decrease of $2,000 per years for a person aged 60 to 64.According
to these figures, the HSA would result in a roughly$26 billion increase
in annual outlays by or for those between ages 25 and 34 and a $33
billion cut in annual outlays by or for those aged 55 to 64. (For this
exercise we have not tried to adjust for the relationship betweenfamily
size and age, a factor that would moderate the net subsidy to theolder
cohorts but would not in our estimation greatly affect the conclusions.)
This calculation, however, neglects the fact that the younger group
will enjoy lower premiums when they are older. No less a policy analyst
than President Clinton emphasized this point: "If you have a community
rating system, who gets hurt from the present system? Who paysmore?
Young, single, healthy people will pay more. But it's fair. Youknow
why? Because under our system, all the young people without insurance
will get insurance and because if they're young and healthy,they'll be
middle aged like me some day and they'll get the benefit of this sys-
tem."3 The President is correct in pointing out that lower premiums in
older years will work to offset the higher premiums the young payearly
in life. It is also true that there is a level-premium systemof paying for
health care insurance, as in whole life insurance policies, under which
the higher premium paid by a young person is actuariallyfairly balanced
by lower premiums he pays when older. What cannot beavoided, how-
ever, is that those generations that areolder at the time of transition to a
pure community-rated system gain and thattheir gain has to be made
up by someone, either those who are young atthe time of transition or
by others yet further down the line.
2.2 Accounting for Intergenerational Transfers
The tool needed to analyze this redistribution is generational account-
ing, as developed by Laurence Kotlikoff (1992) and colleagues(Auerbach
et al., 1991). A separate chapter in the fiscal 1995 budgetprovides esti-
mates of these generational burdens for 1992 and estimatesthe effects of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 and the pro-
posed Health Security Act on these baseline estimates (Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, 1994). Table 1 displays thegenerational accounts,
defined as the estimated present value of net payments to governments
(taxes less transfers) at all levels by members of various birthcohorts
over the remainder of their lives, takenfrom the 1995 budget.
Remarks by President Bifi Clinton to the Conference of Business for SocialResponsibility,
Grand Hyatt Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 21, 1993.Community-Rated Health Insurance135
TABLE 1
Generational Accounts for 1992 Under Different Policies
(in thousands of dollars)
Source: Excerpted from Budget of the United States Government, Analytical Perspectives, Fiscal Year 1995, Office
of Management and Budget, Table 3-6, p. 28.
It is important to understand the meaning of the entry in the table for
"future generations." Unlike the other entries in the table, it is nota
projection of any generation's actual net tax liability. Rather it is the
outcome of a thought experiment, intended to give a measure of the
imbalance implied by projecting existing policy. The thought experiment
imposes a different system on generations born from tomorrowon, dif-
ferent from that actually projected for everyone currently alive. Under
the different system, that uniform, net (of transfers) lifetime tax liability,
is imposed on all cohorts that would just barely bring into balance the
intertemporal budget constraint of government, the requirement that
the net present value of net payments to the government equal thesum
of the present value of government exhaustive expenditures plus the
outstanding stock of government debt. (More precisely, the thought
experiment imposes a net lifetime tax liability that is the same ratio to
lifetime earnings for each cohort. Earningsare typically assumed to
grow at some constant rate of productivity change, so the uniform dollar
amount is also thought of as growing at this rate.)
The hypothetical lifetime burden imposed on the first future generation
cohort is comparable to the net tax burden of those agedzero in the
current year, in that it refers to an entire lifetime of taxes and transfers to
and from all levels of government. The larger the generationalaccount for
future generations is in comparison with the generational account for
those currently aged zero, the larger is the implied passing of nettax
burdens toward the future. Although there is no scientific criterion for
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what the relative burdens ought to be, equality might betaken to repre-
sent a kind of distributional neutrality, implying the same averageratio of
net payments to earning for all generations, startingwith those just born.
The tool of generational accounting is intended to overcomethe lack of
economic substance of conventional deficit accounting. Table 1displays a
typical use for this tool and shows that, according to the estimates,both
OBRA 1993 and the HSA would have substantially reducedthe difference
in net tax burdens between current and future generationsby raising the
total tax burden on today's living generations, especially theolder genera-
tions. Focusing on the effect of the nSA, and taking thesimple average of
the two figures for males and females, according to Table 1,the average
projected net payments of those born in 1992 would have beenincreased
by about 5 percent, or $3,250, from $61,250 by adoptionof the Clinton
health reform. With OBRA 1993 but without HSA, balancingthe long-
term budget constraint would require a net payment per personof
$138,350 if living generations were held to the projectedfiscal path. The
HSA was projected to reduce this amount by $26,050.
The figures presented are driven by transactions that passthrough the
government's fiscal institutions. In the case of the HSA, the effect onthe
budget occurs primarily through claimed reductions in the paymentsfor
health care that result from cost containment. It is a shortcomingof
conventional budgetary accounting that such calculations fail to measure
the effects of policies implemented through mandates.
This point is very clearly illustrated by the case of a mandatethat
requires community rating of health insurance. The analysis inthe bud-
get of the generational effects of the HSA ignoresthe hidden, but sub-
stantial, intergenerational effects of its mandated community rating.To
quantify this effect, we calculate the equivalent increment to genera-
tional accounts that the mandate would cause.
3. ESTIMATING THE INTERGENERATIONALEFFECT
WHEN PEOPLE PAY THEIR OWN BILLS
A shift to a compulsory health insurance system with communityrating
based on age would effect some redistributions within age groups
("birth cohorts"). Healthy people and those with relatively poorhealth
status but long-standing insurance coverage(who are therefore paying
the same premiums as healthy people) would see their costsincrease,
while those with poorer health status or intermittent insurance coverage
would see their costs decline. Pure community rating changesthe pay-
ments made by (or perhaps, on behalf ofwe return tothis point below)
people in different birth cohorts.Community-Rated Health Insurance137
To estimate this effect, we start by projecting into the future the health
care outlays of each already-living generation throughout its expected
insured lives (which is from the present age to age 65, when they be-
come eligible for Medicare) on the assumption that each person is pay-
ing for his own health care, year by year. (An age-adjusted community
rating scheme would produce the same result.) We then calculate for
each generation the annual payment it would make under a pure
community-rated plan, again on the assumption that each person is
paying his own premiums, year by year. Expressed in per capita terms
for each birth-year cohort, the discounted present value of the increase
in year-by-year payments represents the effective increase in the genera-
tional account that results from a shift to community rating, all on the
assumption that each person is paying his own premiums. (If the result
is negative, the cohort gains from the shift.)
Arguably, in the status quo ante, people are not responsible for their
own health care costs. Retirees with guaranteed coverage from their
former employers, for example, would not be affected by a shift to com-
munity rating. Instead, those responsible for retirees would experience
the impact. In the subsequent further section we discuss the likely im-
pact of such considerations on the intergenerational effect of the hypo-
thetical policy change. We conclude that the most important instance is
the responsibility of parents for the health care of their children. By
combining the estimates for "own pay" case with data on the age distri-
bution of parents, we are able to extend the analysis in a further section
to incorporate the assumption that in the status quo the payments on
behalf of children are made by their parents.
If health care costs are on a rising path, there is what amounts to a
continuing transition toward community rating. That is, there is a
continuing effective shift of the burden of paying for health care to-
ward younger and future generations. A shift to community rating
decreases the amount that will be paid by those now living. As a
matter of simple bookkeeping, there is a corresponding increase in the
amount to be paid by everyone else, that is, those born from tomor-
row on, whom we describe as "future generations." For this purpose,
we treat the present as 1994, so the future generations are those born
in 1995 and later. The increase in burdens on future generations is
measured by the uniform payment at birth for each person born into
those cohorts that would be exactly sufficient to make up the shortfall.
(More precisely, the extra payment is uniform in wage units, where
wages are assumed to grow at a specified uniform rate of productivity
increase.) A detailed algebraic exposition of all our calculations in con-
tained in Appendix A.138Bradford & Max
3.1 Current Cost Estimates
To develop burden figures, we need a specification of the set of services
to be financed and estimates of their cost. For this purpose, we have
taken as a starting point the HSA proposal, which specified a benefit
package and for which premium estimates were developed by the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). (The premium estimates
are cost estimates, since the premium receipts were required to cover the
cost of the program.)
Because the cost estimates were central to the budgetary implications
of the reform proposal, and therefore politically contentious, they were
subjected to a good deal of independent review. In almost every other
study, the premium that would be required to cover the benefits defined
in the HSA was estimated to be substantially higher than that projected
by HCFA. A summary of the different estimates as reported by the
Employee Benefit Research Institute is presented in Table 2. As can be
seen, the deviations are quite significant.
Several different methodologies were used to derive the premium
estimates outlined in Table 2. HCFA, Hewitt Associates, and HIAA
(Health Insurance Association of America) used actuarial models com-
bined with their own data sources to derive their estimates, while Em-
TABLE 2
Various Estimates of 1994 Premiums under the Health Security Act for
Selected Premium Categories
(dollars)
Single adult 1,932 2,1002,202 2,285 2,4402,610
(100.0)(108.7)(114.0)(118.3)(126.3)(135.0)
Couple, no children 3,865 4,2004,4044,5704,880 5,219
(100.0)(108.7)(113.9)(118.2)(126.3)(135.0)
Single parent 3,8934,0954,008 4,603 4,6194,442
(100.0)(105.2)(103.0)(118.2)(118.6)(114.1)
Two parent 4,360 5,565 6,2105,155 6,946 7,153
(100.0)(127.6)(142.4)(118.2)(159.3)(164.1)
Note: Parenthetical entries show the ratio to Health Security Act estimate in percent. HIAA estimates
were revised from original table to reflect an update in HIAA's estimate.
Source: Health Reform: Examining the Alternatives, Employee Benefits Research Institute, Issue Brief 147,
March 1994, Table 7; Premiums in Regional Health Alliances under the Clinton Administration
Proposed Health Security Act, Health Insurance Association of America, Acturial memorandum,
February 16, 1994 (revised). Differences calculated by the authors from the original table.
Premium
Category ClintonCBO EBRIWyattHewittHIAA*Community-Rated Health Insurance139
ployee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI), Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), and Wyatt used adjusted measures of national expenditures (Em-
ployee Benefits Research Institute, 1994). Each study made some at-
tempt to estimate the cost of expanding coverage to the currently unin-
sured and the Medicaid populationa major source of the differences in
each of their results.
The disparity in these estimates prompted the American Academy of
Actuaries (1993) to review the methodology used by HCFA in arriving at
its estimates. Among other findings, the Academy work group deter-
mined that "the national average target premiums prepared by the Clin-
ton Administration, in accordance with the constraints of the Health
Security Act, may be understated by as much as 20 percent....[E}sti-
mates calculated without these constraints could range anywhere from 8
percent to 54 percent higher than the Administration's estimates (Doran
et al, 1994).
We base our projections on the assumption that costs are 15 percent
higher than those implicit in the administration premium estimates for
the HSA, reflecting an intermediate point in the range of differing esti-
mates as seen in Table 2. The reader can easily substitute an alternative
assumption, since its effect is simply to scale up or down the estimated
burdens by a simple proportion.
We used the expected alliance population as given by the American
Academy of Actuaries to convert the per adult premium under the HSA
to an estimated per capita premium of $1,488, considering all family
types.4 To this premium we applied the 15 percent factor discussed
above, implying a per capita premium of $1,711 for 1994.
3.2 Growth in Health Care Costs over Time
Analysts have grown accustomed to thinking about the growth of health
care cost in terms of the rate of growth of aggregate outlays on health
care compared with the rate of growth of aggregate output (GDP). His-
torically, this difference has ranged from 1.2 percent in the 1950s to 3
percent in the 1980s and early 1990s. An alternative measure is the
changing share of outlays on health care in the aggregate flow of goods
and services, 14.3 percent of GDP in 1994. Current government baseline
estimates of health expenditures expect that the ratio of health spending
to GDP will stand at almost 19 percent of GDP by the year 2000, reaching
over 30 percent by the year 2030 (Council of Economic Advisers, 1993;
The "expected affiance population" refers to the average insurance pooi expected under
the HSA. Because it is randomly formed, and representative, we use this estimate as the
expected average premium for the entire population.140Bradford & Max
TABLE 3
Annual Growth Rates of Expenditures per Capita, 1948-1998
(percent)
Source: Eugene Steuerle (1994).
Congressional Budget Office, 1993; Burner et al., 1992). If health care
spending grows at an annual rate of 1.5 percent above the growth in
GDP, health care will account for 15.4 percent of GDP in the year 2000,
22.3 percent in 2030, and almost a third of GDP by 2060. At a growth rate
of 3 percent above GDP, health spending wifi consume 16.6 percent of
GDP in 2000, reaching 55 percent of GDP by 2060.
Table 3 (Steuerle, 1994) shows the annual growth rates of expenditures
per capita on health care (and, by subtraction, onall other consumption)
over various historical periods, as well asthe implication of a continua-
tion of the 3 percent gap into the further future (see also Fuchs, 1990). As
the figures show, if the trend continues, health care would constitute 76
percent of the 1988-1998 growth in GDPup from the 27 percent inthe
1980s.
Our approach to the range of uncertainty about the future courseof
health care costs is to develop projections based on alternative assump-
tions about the cost of providing health care to the average person of a
given age. Specifically, we present estimates based on the assumptions
of steady growth in this age-adjusted cost of 0, 3, and 5 percent per
annum relative to the rate of growth of productivity.
A rising trend of health care's share in the value of goods and services
produced (and consumed) could be the result of lagging labor productiv-
ity growth in the health care sector relative to the "all other" sector,
combined with a shift in the composition of demand toward health care
(Baumol, 1993; Bradford, 1969). A shift in demand toward health care
could be a consequence of rising income or of institutional factors lead-
ing to a rising standard of health care, owing to continuing development
of expensive therapies.
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health care is limited, so that the market-clearing price of a given level of
health care, in terms of nonhealth care goods and services, rises over
time (this would be the sensible interpretation of the term health care
cost inflation). These two views of the historical trend are very different,
but researchers have had difficulty sorting out with confidence which is
closer to the truth.5 Our projections are agnostic on this issue. For exam-
ple, 3 percent per annum would be the result of a 3 percent annual
increase in the price index of a standard set of services in excess of the
increase in the general wage level, with no change in the quality of
services. Alternatively, it would be the result of an increase of 3 percent
per annum in real services purchased, with no change in the price of
health care services relative to the wage level.
Following the practice in the generational accounts presentation in the
FY 1995 budget, we assume throughout that eventually the increase of
health care costs, relative to productivity, comes to a stop. Specifically,
as in the budget, we assume that after the year 2030 the rate of growth of
health care cost (controlling for age) is just equal to the rate of growth of
productivity.
3.3 Age Adjustments
The reason that the pure community premium for a standardized pack-
age of services differs from an age-adjusted premium is the systematic
relationship between age and health care cost. To quantify this connec-
tion we use age adjusters. Age adjusters, an example of the more general
concept of risk adjusters (American Academy of Actuaries, 1993a), ex-
press the cost of serving the population in different age classes. A profile
of age adjusters that assigns, say, 4.3 to age 30 and 7.8 to age 40, would
express the fact that providing the specified package of benefits to a 30-
year-old costs, on average, 4.3 I 7.8 = 55% of the cost of providing the
same package to a 40-year-old.
As the example suggests, the applicable age adjusters depend on the
precise specification of the associated benefit package. The HSA analysis
does not provide us with such adjusters, so we have to make do with
available indexes of the relative cost of serving populations of different
ages. Despite the intention of several lawmakers to mandate that premi-
ums be community rated with appropriate adjustments for age, there is
little detailed public information on such adjusters. Insurance compa-
nies do use information on age in setting their premiums, but most are
very reluctant to share their data because a company's ability to deter-
For a discussion, see Council of Economic Advisers (1993), Chapter 4.142Bradford & Max
mine risk is a significant factor in its competitive advantage.6 Thus, they
regard their adjusters as proprietary.
We have collected adjusters from several different sources and have
found overlap in the way in which different age groups are rated. The
adjusters are not the same, in part, because different companies develop
adjusters to reflect the specific population demographics and costs in
their market areas. Another complication is that health maintenance
organizations (1-IMOs) and fee-for-service insurers differ somewhat in
their adjustments for different groups. HMOs, which rely on gatekeep-
ers and practice guidelines, use much "smoother" riskadjusters, with
less adjustment between groups.7 Finally, different insurers have differ-
ent means of adjusting and accounting for different risks. One company,
for example, may load the costs associated with birth into the first year
after delivery, while another insurer may spread that risk over the first
few years of a child's life. Figure 1 shows the age adjustment profiles
from the several sets we were able to collect, using a simple average of
gender-specific data.
Several government agencies have studied the relative cost and use of
health care services by different age categories.8 While such surveys are
not in and of themselves considered appropriate for estimating expected
cost by age, the data are broadly consistent with the different age adjust-
ers shown in Figure 1. Health care costs are high in thefirst few years of
life because of well-baby care and other risks associated with birth. Costs
stabilize around age 5 and remain low until age 20. At this point, mostly
because of increased incidence of pregnancy in females, costs increase
substantially but remain below the "average." The midpoint of risk oc-
curs between the ages of 40 and 49. From this point, costs increase
substantially with age, ending anywhere from 4 to 5 times the cost of
health care for people in their early teens (an age when risk is at its
lowest).
Table 4 gives the adjustment factors we employ in our calculations.
While any one of the age adjustment estimates shown in Figure 1 could
6There is some controversy as to the effectiveness of risk adjustment models to predict
expected loss. See, for example, Newhouse, 1994. While Newhouse does question the
accuracy of different adjusters, he concludes that even a small increase in predictive ability
can lead to large returns.
This would seem to imply (a) that a shift toward managed care would tend to produce
some of the intergenerational redistribution effects that we are studying for the case of a
shift to community rating and (b) that a further shift toward community rating would have
a lesser redistributional effect than we find for a move from the present "averaged" system
to community rating.











0-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Ages
Source: Proprietary information provided to authors by four insurance and consulting companies.
FIGURE 1. Sample Adjusters Used to Account for Health Differences
in Age from Birth to Age Sixty-four (normalized to 1 for Ages 40-44)
have been used to provide similar results, we used an estimate that is in
the public domain to allow replication of our results. These estimatesare
a reasonable representation of the adjusters we collected.
3.4 Demographics
As shown in Figure 2, the population profile for 1995 is not evenly
distributed across age cohorts but does smooth out in later years.9 Those
aged 30 to 40, the "baby boomers," give rise to a clear bubble in the 1995
profile. A second bubble begins 20 years thereafter, comprising the off-
spring of the baby boomers. People born in a cohort immediately preced-
ing a demographic bubble wifi benefit from having large numbers of
younger people, with relatively low health care costs, averaged in with
older generations to lower the community-rated premium. Those born
immediately after the bubble suffer from having larger cohorts of older
people included in their average when their community-rated premium
is calculated. This effect is somewhat offset by the trailing bubble.
The population data we employed originated with the Social Security
Administration, whose projections extend into the middle of the next
century. Jagadeesh Gokhale, who provided us with an extensive dataset144Bradford & Max
TABLE 4
The Relationship of Health Status to Age, as Expressed byAdjustment
Factor; Birth through Age Sixty-Four
Source: Calculated from a report by the Congressional Research Service and Hay Huggins, Inc., 1988,
cited in General Accounting Office (1992), p. 32.
tracking population by age and sex through 2200, extrapolated projec-
tions past the Social Security estimates by continuing the various popula-
tion trends present at the tail end of the Social Security data. We used
the Gokhale data through 2080 to estimate burdens on identifiedbirth
cohorts. To compute the burden on future generations, we require an
assumed rate of population growth for the years beyond 2080. For this
purpose we use the average growth rateof the newborn population in
the Gokhale data for the years 2071-2080 (0.733 percent).
To calculate the change in net payment into the system by thosewho
are born after 1994 ("future generations"), wedetermined the constant
amount (in terms of earning power; for this exercise the payment grows
at the rate of productivity increase) that, if paid atbirth by each new-
born, would exactly cover the difference between the streamof pay-
ments he will make under the community-rated systemand what he
would have had to pay under the status quo ante system. This calculation
is a measure of the amount that wifi be saved by living generations,in
total, by the shift in policy. In an ongoing system, the excess is forever
passed along to those born in the yet further future. Our calculation is
designed to determine the effect of stopping the passing of the buck and
sharing the problem equally over all generations born from tomorrow
forward.
It should be emphasized that this net payment is a hypothetical quan-
tity, designed to provide a concrete measure of the extent to whichthe
shift in systems transfers a burden toward the future. It is the exact
analogue of the generational account of "future generations" in Table 1,
and should be compared both with that figure and with the amounts for
those who are aged zero, that is, born in 1994, in our tables. As in the
case of generational accounts, a possible standardof distributional neu-
trality between current newborns and future generations would be equal-
Age Factor Age Factor
0-24 0.63 45-49 1.10
25-29 0.68 50-54 1.35
30-34 0.73 55-59 1.55
35-39 0.85 60-64 2.00

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ity of this lifetime excess of payments over health care received. But our
attention focuses equally on the redistribution from younger living gen-
erations toward older living generations, especially the middle-aged. (In
our central case, all cohorts aged 30 and older in 1994 gain from the shift,
and the largest gain goes to those aged 50.)
A word about immigration: The population projections on which we
have relied incorporate immigration. In projecting the cost of the system
and the payments by the various living cohorts, immigrants have been
included. By contrast, in calculating the hypothetical net effect on future
generations of making the change from pay-your-own-way to commu-
nity rating, we have placed the burden of balancing the system on the
sequence of newborns, starting in 1995. It is difficult to say whether the
result is biased up or down. If inunigrants arrive as young people, they
help out by chipping in more than they cost. If they arrive as older
people, they add to the problem. In recent years, the median age of
immigrants has been about 30-28.3 in 1994, to be precise (U.S. Govern-
ment Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994). The results de-
scribed below suggest that this is roughly the boundary between gainers
and losers. We did not consider the possible gain from attempting to
deal more systematically with this problem worth the cost.
3.5 Discount Rate
Present-value calculations rely heavily on the estimation of an appropri-
ate discount rate. The generational accounts presented in the Budget are
based on the real discount rate of 6 percent, roughly the midpoint be-
tween the real historical rate on federal government bonds and the aver-
age real return to private sector capital (which includes a premium for
risk). We present results for real discount rates of 3, 6, and 9 percent.
3.6 Results
Figure 3 shows the difference in net payments in year 1 (assuming start-
up in 1994) between the pure community-rated system and an age-
adjusted community-rated premium, by age of the insured. This figure
conveys the effect of the imposition of community rating on the initial
year's cash flow, a substantial decrease in payments by older cohorts,
made up by increases in payments by younger cohorts.1° The increased
payments by younger cohorts are, to a degree, compensated when they
themselves are older. The decreased payments by older cohorts upon
10These results are in line with other estimates of the transfers by age. See, for example,



































































































































































































































































































introduction of pure community rating constitute a purewindfall gain to
them and are not compensated for bysubsequently larger payments.
Figure 4 shows the expected path of paymentsfor people born in 1945,
1965, 1995, and 2015 as it would unfold werethe system to continue
unchanged until those cohorts have reached the age of Medicareeligibil-
ity under the assumption of zero growth inhealth care costs and zero
productivity growth. Also shown is the pathof the expected community-
rated premium. Because health care costs are assumedconstant, the varia-
tion in the community-rated premiumresults only from changes in the
demographic profile of the population over time. This figuremakes clear
that people born in 1945 are certain winners(always assuming no change
in the quality of coverage) in that the requiredpayment under community
rating is always below the age-adjusted paymentthat would be required
in the status quo. Likewise, the figure showsthe expected path of gains
and losses in cash-flow terms for those born in 1965,1995, and 2015. The
longer the path remains above the community-ratedpremium, the more
the gain to the cohort from a shift away fromage-adjusted rating.
Table 5 summarizes the effect on various generationsof a shift to
community rating as of January 1, 1994, under theassumption of a 0.75
percent annual growth in productivity and a rangeof assumptions about
the applicable real discount rate and the path ofhealth care costs. The
calculations treat insurance payments as made infull at the beginning of
each year. The entries for the various ages can bethought of as additions
to the generational accounts,defined as the present value of net pay-
ments (so a negative sign represents animprovement in position), as of
1994. an exception is the entry for the generationborn in 2015, which
represents the addition to the lifetime net taxliability of that generation
measured as of its date of birth (treating the increment tohealth care
costs due to the shift to community rating as atax), deflated for the
productivity growth from 1994 to 2015 to make itcomparable to the
figure for the age zero cohort in 1994. It is aprojection made under the
assumption that the community-rated systemremains in place through
their lifetimes.
For what we take as central case assumptions(discount rate of 6 per-
cent, health care cost growth rate, through2030, of 3 percent, relative to
productivity growth of 0.75 percent), the shift tocommunity rating is
estimated to generate a gain of $17,300 per person aged 50in 1994. The
gainers extend to those somewhere between ages10 and 20, where the
break-even age is found. Those born in 1994 arehanded an extra pay-
ment obligation with a discounted valueof $10,800 each. To put these














































































































































































































































































































































































Present Value of Net per Capita Payments Under Shift
to Community Rating
0.75% productivity growth, 6% real discount
(thousands of 1994 dollars)
in 1994 0.00
Health Care Relative Cost Growth Rate
0.03 0.05
60 -9.7 -10.3 -10.7
50 -13.8 -17.3 -20.2
40 -9.8 -15.4 -21.0
30 -3.8 -10.0 -17.8
20 1.9 -2.8 -10.5
10 5.8 4.8 1.7
0 8.2 10.8 12.6
Future generations 9.0 19.3 33.1
Born in 2015 9.4 22.6 40.5
Source: Authors' calculations.
of 1992 (averaged over males and females) of ($81,000 + $2,400) I 2 =
$41,700 for the 50-year-olds, and ($78,400 + $44,100) /2 = $61,250 for the
newborns, in the base case (after OBRA 1993) presented in Table 1.
By contrast, the figures shown in Table 5 for future generations refer
not to a projection but rather to the hypothetical burden measure dis-
cussed above. The central case estimate of $19,400 may be compared
with the generational account estimate for future generations as of 1992
(for the same baseline policy) of ($177,100 + $99,600) /2 = $138,350. The
latter reflects the estimated impact of a major deficit-reducing effort
(OBRA 1993), which reduced the generational account for future genera-
tions by $21,300 (from ($205,500 + $113,800) /2 = $159,650). The figures
make clear that the regulatory policy shift, with no direct budgetary
implications, is large in its intergenerational transfer effect in compari-
son with many policy options considered withinthe usual budgetary
framework.
For the case with low growth of relative health care costs, while some
recapture of benefits occurs for younger people and for those to be born
in the future, those persons will not completely recapture the windfall
gained by older generations. An increase in the rate of growth of health
care costs has two effects. First, an increase in thescale of the entire
stream of payments tends to raise both the pre- and the, postpolicy
change figures for all cohorts. Second, the shift to community ratingCommunity-Rated Health Insurance151
works to the advantage of everyone living at the time of transition,
relative to future generations, the higher the growth rate of health care
costs. This is due to the fact that community rating forces younger gen-
erations to share the costs at the point when those costs are relatively
high. In effect, a new shift to community rating happens every year, so
that the higher costs of health care in old age are moved forward to
future younger generations. (If health care costs are declining, the new
gain by all living gainers is reduced, the net payment by all living net
payers in increased, and the net cost to future generations is reduced.
The latter effect occurs because the net gain to all those currently alive is
reduced.)
The effect of that shift can be seen in Table 6, which is based on a zero
rate of discount. In this case, all living generations gain, even the 2015
generation, by virtue of spreading the cost of health care over growing
numbers of people in the further future, regardless of the rate of growth
of health care cost, with very large gains evident for the young and the
2015 cohort at a growth rate of health care costs of 5 percent. Because it
appears in this case that the change in the system creates only winners
(whereas, in fact, there is a large and growing burden being passed to
the further future), Table 6 demonstrates the importance of bringing into
the picture the "future generation" calculation in Table 5. (We do not
show a figure for future generations in this table because the required
series for the calculation does not converge with a zero rate of discount.)
TABLE 6
Present Value of Net per Capita Payment under Shift to Community
Rating Assuming Zero Percent Productivity Growth and Zero Percent
Real Discount




Health Care Relative Cost Growth Rate
0.00 0.03 0.05
60 10.7 11.4 11.9
50 20.6 26.4 31.4
40 21.9 36.5 51.6
30 19.1 45.8 80.5
20 15.0 53.4 111.9
10 8.8 45.4 104.9
0 2.4 30.3 78.3
Born in 2015 0.9 8.2 22.1152Bradford & Max
4. ACCOUNTING FOR THIRD-PARTY PAYERS IN THE
STATUS QUO AND COMMUNITY-RATED SYSTEMS
The calculations above incorporate the assumption that in the status quo
ante everyone pays his own health care bills, year by year, and everyone
pays his own community-rated premiumeach year in the community-
rated system. In actuality, for many people, health care bills are paid by
third parties in the status quo ante as would probably be true in
community-rated systems as well. To assess the implications of this
possibility for the intergenerational distributive effects of a shift in sys-
tems, we consider various prominent categories of third parties.
4.1 Insurance companies
People buying health insurance privately, year by year, to cover their
own health care costs are, in effect, paying their ownbifis in their cur-
rent premiums. For these people, the shift to community ratingwould
be reasonably described by the analysis above.
If people were to obtain health care coverage on the basis of a fixed
pricethe analogue would be level-premium life insurancea shift to
community rating would affect the insuring entity, for example, the
owners of an insurance company. This situation does not appear tobe
common. A variant does, however, prevail for retireesreceiving guaran-
teed benefits from their companies. Variation in the cost of serving such
people falls on the owners of the guaranteeing companies. A shift to a
community-rated system would benefit these owners if it enabled them
to purchase coverage for their beneficiaries in the private market at the
community premium. The impact on the generational distribution of
burdens would depend on the age distribution of company owners in
relation to that of retirees. We do not attempt to track this effect down,
but it cannot be assumed to be negligible. Warshawsky cites Urban
Institute tabulations based on August 1988 Current Population Survey
data reporting a total population of 10 million retirees, over 7 million of
whom were covered by health insurance paid for at least in part by
former employers. Over 4 million retirees were reported as covered by
insurance for which the firm paid all of the premiums (Warshawsky,
1992).
Our focus in this study is national community rating, with obligatory
purchase of insurance, implemented through regulation. As has been
mentioned, several states have imposed community rating at various
times in the past (Hall, 1994). One might think that adding a federal
requirement would cause no fresh intergenerational distributions inCommunity-Rated Health Insurance153
these jurisdictions. The state regulations, however, do not impose obliga-
tory purchase of insurance. Theory suggests that such a rule will induce
people against whom such a pricing scheme works, suchas young peo-
ple and healthy people, to leave the pool. As a consequence, the in-
tergenerational distribution that would have resulted from the state
rules would have been reduced. A federal rule with mandatory purchase
would then compel the participation of the young and would result in
intergenerational redistribution along the lines developed above, al-
though perhaps moderated to some degree.
4.2 Employers
For people obtaining health care insurance from their employersas a
part of their compensation packages, the story is more complicated.
Employees may pay nothing for their insurance, or theymay pay an
amount that is independent of age (although it may depend on family
status). Because the insurance coverage is implicitly priced in the terms
of employment, it is very difficult to determine who "really"pays. The
question is whether the age profile implicit in the compensation ofem-
ployees mimics the age profile of health care premiums characteristic of
the competitive insurance market.
Under competitive pressure, most commercial insurance is experience
or demographically rated. Table 7 presents estimates prepared by the
American Academy of Actuaries (1993a) of the rating method currently
used in the privately insured market. As the table shows, only 15 million
(10 percent) of the total privately insured population of 157 million fall
under a purely (unadjusted) community rate, with the remaindercov-
ered under methods that may be presumed to have the effect ofage
adjustment. These data, however, concern the cost of insurance to the
employer. Even under experience rating, community rating may exist
within firms purchasing insurance for their employees. While insurance
sold to a large company may be priced on the experience of that com-
pany, for example, it is likely to be provided to the individual employees
on a community-rated basis, using the company as the community. This
arrangement is often known as intracompany community rating. The
extent to which intracompany community rating translates into effective
community rating for the work force depends upon whether the terms
of employment adjust to reflect the different value of health insurance to
workers with different characteristics. Such an adjustment could result
from a sorting of workers into different companies according to health
status and from a tendency for compensation to vary with age in the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































have caused firms and individuals to base employment decisionson the
health status of the individual or on the insurancea given firm may
offer. A sorting of workers into firms based on risk has thereforeoc-
curred. Furthermore, as more firms begin to offer multiple health insur-
ance plans for their employees, risk is further homogenized. A recent
contribution by Louise Sheiner (1994) summarizes the literature and
presents new evidence of the validity of the economists' presumption
that employees "pay for" employer-provided health insurance via adjust-
ment in the overall compensation package (Brown, 1924; O'Neil and
O'Neil, 1994; Gruber and Kreuger, 1991).11
4.3 Governments
Apart from their role as employers, governments provide healthcare to
various groups. Most obviously, the federal Medicareprogram provides
hospital care and subsidized physician care to people aged 65 and older.
In addition, government finances health care for people with particular
health conditions (for example, black lung disease or kidney failure), and
in particular economic circumstances. The federalstate Medicaidpro-
gram, for example, covers low-income people. Relative to the popula-
tion aged 0-64, the beneficiaries of Medicaid are concentratedamong
children and young mothers and those paying the bills area cross-
section of taxpayers. Providing for a compulsory national community-
rated insurance system would presumably result in a shift of the burden
of financing the system from somewhat older taxpayers to somewhat
younger payers of the community-rated premium.
4.4 Parents
In the context of our earlier analysis in this paper, parentsare "third-
party payers" on behalf of their children. It is possible that the ultimate
burden of variation in health care costs paid for by parents is shifted by
offsetting variation in other transfers from parents to children. Gen-
erational accounting is, by convention, silenton the question of the
ultimate incidence of payments by generations. Generationalaccounts
record estimates of the discounted values of net payments by different
cohorts (normally, to governments, in this case to healthcare providers
or insurance companies). As in the case of variation in payments by a
cohort to governments (for example, resulting froma tax cut or tax
increase), variation in payments to the health care systemmay result in
11Research on whether workers pay for mandated benefits goes back at least to Harry
Gunnison Brown, (1924). For a recent discussion, see O'Neil and O'Neil (1994). See also
Gruber and Kreuger (1991) and Gruber (1994).156Bradford & Max
offsetting adjustments to intergenerational transfers.In this sense, gen-
erational accounts, and our analysis, record "impact effects"of policy
changes.
5. ESTIMATING THE INTERGENERATIONALEFFECT
WHEN PARENTS PAY
To account for the fact that parents pay the bills fortheir children, we
reallocate the payments, both before and after the policychange, for
cohorts aged 0-18, to older cohorts. Thus, we confine the payersof
health care costs to those aged 19 and up. For this purpose, wetake the
distribution of ages of mothers in 1990 as the distributionof ages of
mothers of newborns in all years. (Strictly speaking, thedistribution of
ages of mothers in a given yearincludes the influence of the demo-
graphic history, which affects the distribution and fertilityof women of
different ages in the population.) Since the object is to allocatepayments
to responsible adults (aged 19 and up),rather than to mothers, and since
fathers are, on average, about two years older than mothers, toapproxi-
mate the distribution of the average age of parents, weused our derived
distribution of mothers' ages, shifted by one year. Eliminatingthe tails of
the distribution, with very small weight, gave us a spanof ages of
parents from 16 to 45 at the time of the birth ofthe child. To determine
the pattern of payments under the "parents pay" versionof the analysis,
we reallocate the paymentsdetermined under the "own pay" version,
described earlier, to the respective older cohorts. This calculation re-
quires two rounds of reallocation. In the first round,the payments by
cohorts aged 0-15 are allocated to those 16 to 45 yearsolder. This num-
ber adds to the payments made by those aged 16 andolder. In the
second round, the payments of those aged 16, 17, and 18 areallocated to
those 16 to 45 years older than they are. The resulting paymentprofile is
thus 0 for those aged 0-18, and is higher than the "own pay" amountfor
those aged 19 to 63. In effect, the bills of the youngest parents,those
aged 16 to 18, are further reallocated to their parents, who are thegrand-
parents of the youngest of the children in the analysis.
Table 8, corresponding to Table 5 for the pay-your-own way assump-
tions, summarizes for the parents-pay assumptions theeffect on various
generations of a shift to community rating as of January 1, 1994,under
the central case assumption of a 0.75 percent annual growth inproductiv-
ity and a range of assumptions about the applicablereal discount rate
and the path of health care costs. (Appendix B provides atabular presen-
tation of a wide range of alternative assumptions about keyparameters.)
It will be seen that, as would be expected, the parents-pay assump-Community-Rated Health Insurance157
TABLE 8
Present Value of Net per Capita Payments under Shift to Community
Rating When Parents Pay for Children
(thousands of 1994 dollars)
Note: Assuming 0.75 percent productivity growth and 6 percent real discount.
Source: Authors' calculations.
tions result in smaller intergenerational transfer effects from the shift to
community rating. For the central case (discount rate of 6 percent,
growth rate of health care costs through 2030 of 3 percent, relative to
productivity growth of 0.75 percent), the shift to community rating is
estimated to generate a gain of $16,700 (versus $17,300 under pay-your-
own way assumptions) per person aged 50 in 1994. The break-even age
is increased from somewhere between ages 10 and 20 to somewhere
between ages 20 and 30. Those born in 1994 are handed an extra pay-
ment obligation with a discounted value of $7,100 (versus $10,800) each.
The central case "future generations" estimate is substantially reduced,
from $19,400 to $9,400. Still, as a comparison with Table 1 suggests, the
impact is significant in relation to other policy changes.
6. CONCLUSION
It is a poorly appreciated fact that mandates and other regulations,
which are not accounted for in the government's budget, can duplicate
the effect of spending and tax-transfer programs, which are. Important
examples are to be found in the recent health care reform debate in the
United States. Interestingly, it was recognized by official agencies that
mandating the provision by employers of insurance to their employees
was equivalent to a tax on employers to pay for a transfer to employees.
It was, however, little noticed that the contemplated mandate that insur-
Generation's age
in 1994
Health Care Relative Cost Growth Rate
0.00 0.03 0.05
60 -9.7 -10.3 -10.7
50 -13.3 -16.7 -19.5
40 -7.2 -12.5 -17.8
30 1.0 -3.8 -10.5
20 7.7 6.3 2.0
10 5.5 7.6 8.5
0 3.4 7.1 11.6
Future Generations 3.5 9.3 17.8
Born in 2015 3.5 10.0 19.9158Bradford & Max
ance companies provide health insurance on a community-ratedbasis
would amount to an implicit addition to the federal deficit in effecting
transfers of income toward older generations, at the expense of younger
and future birth cohorts.
Using data from a variety of sources, we conclude that the effect
would be substantial. The magnitudes depend on assumptions about
discount, health care cost, and productivity growth rates. The effect also
depends on who is responsible for paying the health care bills of chil-
dren. Under the assumption that parents pay for their children (which
moderates the intergenerational transfer) and our central case assump-
tions about the discount, cost, and productivity growth rates, we esti-
mate that a shift to community rating would generate gains for people
over age 30 in 1994, $16,700 per person aged 50, forexample, at the cost
to younger cohorts. Those born in 1994 would acquire an extra payment
obligation with a discounted value of $7,100 each. The burden passed
along to future generations can be described as a $9,300 per capita tax at
birth (growing with productivity). The analysis makes clear that the
regulatory policy shift, with no direct budgetary implications, would
have an intergenerational transfer effect comparable to what would be
considered a major change in on-budget tax or transfer programs.
APPENDIX A: ALGEBRAIC DESCRIPTION OF THE
CALCULATIONS
Let the variabletkstand for the population in year t of people born in
year k, Ntk the net payment they make forhealth insurance in year t,
and Gtk the cost of providing covered health care to them. Nfk depends
on the system of pricing insurance, forexample, the choice between
community-rated and unregulated private market systems, and on the
identity of the payers under whatever pricing scheme exists. Gtk is
taken as the same for all alternative insurance regimes, but we consider
alternative paths. The analysis in the paper consists of working out the
implications of the choice of payment regime for the discounted value
of payments by each generation.
The key parameters are the real rate of discount, r, the rate of produc-
tivity growth, g, and the rate of growth, h, in health care outlay per
person. The latter is, in turn, specified by its rate of growth, h1, relative to
earnings, soh = h1+g. These parameters are assigned alternative values
to specify scenarios. The parameters r and g are treated as constants for
each scenario. We consider 3%, 6%, and 9% for r, 0%, 0.25%, 0.75%, and
1.25% for g. Following the treatment of health care expenditures for
purposes of the generational accounting presented in the FY 1995bud-Community-Rated Health Insurance159
get, we limit the period of relative increase in health care outlays per
person to the period up until the year 2030. So h1 is assigned alternative
values 0%, 3%, and 5% until 2030 and 0 after that. Our centralcase is r =
6%, h1 = 3% (until 2030), and g = 0.75%.
An additional parameter, the rate of growth of the cohorts of newborns
beyond the last year for which we have explicit projections (theyear 2080),
n, is by projection from the last 10 years of the data and has value n =
0.733%. (The numbers of people of each age from 2080 on is determined by
assuming that the ratio to the number of newborns is the same as in 2080,
so numbers of people of each age are assumed to grow at n after 2080.)
A.1 Determining the Population at Each Time
The populations,t,k'for t = 1994,...2080 and k < 2081, are data. For
t> 2080 and all kt, we assume
P - P 1+\t-2080
t,k 2080,2080+k - t' J
A.2 Determining the Cost of Serving a Generation in a Particular
Year
We assume that the cost of serving a person depends only on theper-
son's age, a, and the year. The dependence on age is expressed through
the concept of an age adjuster, Wa. As described in the body of thepaper,
the scale value of Wa is arbitrary: w26 / w40 describes the cost of servinga
26-year-old relative to the cost of serving a 40-year-old. Given a profile of
age adjusters, we can identify the "standard cost," SC, of health care as
the cost of serving a person with an age adjuster equal to 1. Readersmay
find it helpful to think of age adjusters as ranged around the value of 1
for the person with middling health care cost. Among people belowage
65, that middling level would be somewhere between ages 40 and 45. If
the age adjuster profile assigns value 1 at age 45, the other weights,
determined empirically, would, in fact, range from approximately 0.6 for
ages 0 to 24 to 2 for ages 60 to 64. With this choice of units, the standard
cost is the cost of serving a 45-year-old. The weights we actually used,
given in Table 4, have roughly this interpretation. But it should beem-
phasized that the choice of the scale of weights is arbitrary and that the
standardized cost is specified relative to the particular choice of scale.
Once a profile of age adjusters has been determined,we can define the
total age-adjusted equivalent population, TAAE, as the age-adjuster
weighted average of the actual population at time t:
TA.AE =160Bradford & Max
TAAE can be thought of as the number of45-year-olds that are equiva-
lent, from a health care cost point of view, to theactual population at
time t.
The standardized cost of covered health care for 1994 isdetermined
from data. Specifically, as discussed in the text, wetook as a datum the
community-rated premium in the HSA, increased by 15 percent to allow
for underestimation by HCFA, multiplied by the population in1994.
Dividing this by TAAE14 gives us SC1994. Subsequently,
SC = SC14(1 + h1 +g)t_1994,
where recall that h1 is a specified constant through 2030 and 0 afterthat.
The cost of coverage in year t for the generation born in year k isthen
given by
= Wt_kSCtPt,k.
A.3 Determining the Health Insurance Premiums
In the text, we distinguish two methods of determining premiums, un-
regulated or, equivalently for our purposes, age-adjusted community
rating (here designated by the superscript ACR) and purecommunity
rating (PCR). The age-adjusted community-rated premium at time tfor a
person born in year k is thus
pACR_
The pure community-rated premium for a person in year t is foundby
dividing the total cost of providing coverage to the population in a given
year by the size of the population:
pCRG/>P
k k
A.4 Determining the Payment by a Generation in aGiven Year
In the text we distinguish two payment regimes according towho pays
the bills of childrenpay their own (OP) or parents pay (PP). So,for
example, the amount paid in year t by members of the generation born
in k with pure community rating when each cohort is regarded as respon-
sible for its own bills would be designated N'°".
A.4.1 The Pay-Your-Own-Way Case Our focus is on the difference be-
tween age-adjusted community rating and pure community rating Un-Community-Rated Health Insurance161
der each of the two possibilities for the responsibility forpayment. The
net increase in payment for health care incurred in year t by people aged
a as a result of shifting from ACR to PCR when everyone is regarded as
paying his own bills is, for example, p'°- p.A typical point in Figure
3 would be p- allowing 1950 to stand for the birthyear of those
aged 40 to 44 in the grouped data.
The aggregate increase in payments in year t by people ageda as a
result of shifting from ACR to PCR when everyone is regardedas paying
his own bills is given by
NP,0P ?iACR,OP_ D(,PCR- t,t-a t,t-fl t,t-aI-'t t,t-a/
This is the amount that is discounted to 1994 and divided by the popula-
tion of the various ages in the typical entry of Table 5. Defineas the per
capita "net assessment," A, in year t on the generation born inyear k
then living, resulting from a shift in regime, for example, from ACRto
PCR, the discounted (to t) value of the increase in net annualpayments
over their lifetimes. Notice that to identify a net assessment we need to
specify the regime shift (so two items of information), the identity ofthe
payers, the year, and the generation. For most of our exposition, the
regime shift and identity of the payers will be clear from the context. But
the following example, for the generation aged 40 in 1994, will illustrate
the concept and the calculations:
1994+64-40
_Nj,0P \
t,1994-40 t,1994-40) APCR,ACR Op 1=1994
-1994, 1954
1994,1954
where the sum is taken out to the point where those aged 40 in 1994
reach Medicare eligibility at age 65.
The calculation for the generation born in 2015 is taken back to itsyear
of birth. For comparability with those born in 1994, the result is then
deflated by the productivity growth between 1994 and 2015,so that the
quantity can be understood in terms of the same earningpower. So the
expression in the table is
2015+64
E(1+r)2015t'N°'°"N'4'°" ,1,2015 1,2015)
'2O15 2015 (1 +g)1992015 = (1 +g)199'2015t'2015
P2015,2015
A.4.2 The Parents-Pay CaseIn assigning the payments due from chil-
dren to their parents, we first determine statistically whatage a parent of162Bradford & Max
a newborn is likely to be, given atotal natality sample that has been
truncated to fit mothers' ages 15 through 4412 Assuming that fathers are,
on average, two years olderthan mothers, we use these ages to approxi-
mate ages of parents 16 to 45. The data then give usthe number of
parents, a of each age, i, 16 through 45, from which wederive the vector
of resulting constants, b16 to b45, summing to 1, that canbe thought of as
the distribution of ages of the people responsiblefor the bills of a ran-






The extra payment in year t made on behalf of children, EBI,kby a
member of the generation born in year k, is the weighted sumof pay-
ments made under the pay-your-own-way assumptionfor the younger
generations. The formula for the pure community-rating case,for exam-
ple, is
EB=
Two passes through the data are made, reassigning first the payments
of ages 15 and under to their parents and second the totalburdens born
by the parents who are aged 16 to 18. The end result is thatchildren of
ages 0-18 are not held accountable forgains or losses, while parents of
up to age 63 have seen their payments grow as aresult of the shifting.
A.5 The Hypothetical Future Generations' Payment
The calculation for the future generations' net paymenthas a similar
structure. The discounted excess of amounts paidby living generations
under the age-adjusted community rating over what they payunder
pure community rating must, as a matterof intertemporal budget con-
straint, be covered, in present value, by payments of generationsnot yet
living. It is a straightforward matter to calculate this excess,which we
label the "passed burden," PB. But rather than make aprediction about
how the long-term budget constraint will be satisfied,the hypothetical
12The data on natality originates from Vital Statistics of the United States (1990).The data are
arranged to depict total live births in 1990 per each age of mother, 10 to 47. Forsimplicity,




athought experiment is to determine "future generations' assessment" at
t, FA, a flat (in terms of earnings) assessment on each newborn, starting
in year t + 1, that would be paid just sufficient to balance the books.
Adorned with superscripts to specify precisely the policy shift and pay-
ment assumption involved, it is thus defined implicitly by
FA'°"°'°1'(l +g)t'_t(l + r)t_t'Pt',t' t , t,=t+1
which can be solved as
op=
(1+g)tt(1+r)ttP
The numerator in this expression is the change in burden passed for-
ward as a result of the specified regime shift. The denominator is a kind
of discounted stream of newborns. In computing the denominator, we
need to use the long-run growth rate of the population. For the typical




P20802989(1 + n)t_2080(1 +
t=1994(1 + r)t4 t=2080 (1 + r)t1994
where the superscripts have been suppressed. Provided that (1 + n)(1 +
g) < (1 + r), the requirement for convergence of the infinite series in the
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